Four-dimension review (correctness/security/reliability/maintainability) of today's console/bus/login/dashboard/image work found no Critical/High; the HTTP parser, login gate (un-bypassable), bus semantics and the HMAC/PBKDF2/SHA-256 math were verified correct. The Medium findings are fixed here. Security: - Token-gate /api/files and /api/file (were session-only despite the docs/Security page claiming token-gated - arbitrary root-readable file exfiltration). - Neutralize settings-redirect header-splitting: __section/__tab are constrained to safe slugs before going into the Location header (CRLF no longer injects). - One token source (auth::rand_hex): fail loud + non-constant fallback instead of the published "dev-csrf-token" / second-granular wsid when /dev/urandom is unreadable. - Constant-time UI-token compare (auth::ct_eq); write auth.json 0600, dir 0700. - Cap concurrent connections (64, 503 beyond) + 10s head-read deadline, bounding the thread-per-connection flood on the open :80. Reliability/correctness: - Settings persistence now propagates its write error (was swallowed and reported as success with a misleading comment) and writes atomically (temp+rename); deck save atomic too. Auth::login returns None if the session insert failed. - TuningLoop::set_target resets the PID accumulator on a mode change (the old target's integral is in the old units) while keeping the operating point. - Editable-deck JS: monotonic new-block ids (no collision after remove+add), default source frequency (was power_w, not in the live map), symmetric drag-drop placement, re-render after save. Drivers "stopped" shows the bare reason, not JSON-quoted. Maintainability: - New `form` module consolidates the three divergent percent_decode/field copies (web/service/dashboard). Added a test asserting published state topics match the registry contract. Report in code-review-report.md (verdict, accepted-by-design posture incl. the no-TLS / factory-creds residual risk, and a deferred list: ui.rs dead code, deck assets extraction, target_label dedup). 206 lib tests + integration pass, clippy -D warnings clean, no emojis. Image rebuilt with the fixed binary. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BdKQBPjAXpCwmigUov5eQk
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Code review report - alkane-os console/bus/login/dashboard/image
Scope: today's work on feature/afw-os-bundle (bus, registry, service, web, console,
app, main, control, runtime, tuning, auth, dashboard, schema menus, image tooling).
Method: code-review-harness, 4 parallel reviewers (correctness, security, reliability,
maintainability) at high reasoning effort over the branch diff, then fixes applied and
re-verified. Installation-from-stock / restore-to-stock method tooling was out of scope
(DeepSeek Harness's domain; not in this repo).
Verdict: READY TO SHIP (software checkpoint)
No Critical or High findings. The HTTP parser, login/session gate, bus semantics, and the crypto (HMAC-SHA256 / PBKDF2 / SHA-256 against RFC 4231 / RFC 7914 vectors) were verified correct; the session gate cannot be bypassed. Every Medium finding has been fixed and re-verified. Remaining items are Low / maintainability and are listed as deferred.
External tooling: cargo clippy --all-targets -- -D warnings clean; 206 lib tests + all
integration tests pass; no emojis.
Fixed in this pass
Security
/api/filesand/api/filewere reachable with a session but no token, contradicting the module docs and the Security page (arbitrary root-readable file exfiltration). Now token-gated viaauthorised(), matching the advertised control. (web.rs)- Response/header-splitting:
__section/__tabfrom the settings form were interpolated into theLocation:header;%0d%0adecoded to CRLF. Now constrained to safe slugs (safe_slug) before the redirect. (web.rs) - RNG degradation: an unreadable
/dev/urandomsubstituted the published constant"dev-csrf-token"and second-granular, guessable session ids. Now a single token source (auth::rand_hex) that warns loudly and falls back to a per-call, non-constant mix; the CSRF generator delegates to it. (auth.rs, web.rs) - The UI token was compared with
==(timing oracle). Nowauth::ct_eq(constant time). (web.rs) auth.json(password hash) was written umask-default (world-readable). Now created 0600 with the parent dir 0700. (auth.rs)- Unbounded thread-per-connection + no absolute read deadline (flood DoS on the open :80). Now a 64-connection cap (503 beyond it) and a 10 s head-read deadline, on top of the per-read timeout. (web.rs)
Reliability / correctness
- Settings persistence swallowed its write error and reported success with a misleading comment. Now the error propagates (surfaced as the form's rejection) and the write is atomic (temp + rename). Deck save is atomic too. (dashboard.rs, service.rs)
Auth::loginreturned a cookie even if the session insert failed (redirect loop). Now returnsNoneon a poisoned lock. (auth.rs)TuningLoop::set_targetcarried the PID integral across modes whose error is in different units (watts vs millidegrees vs TH/s), injecting a stale push on a mode switch. Now the accumulator resets on a target change while the operating point is kept. (tuning.rs)- Editable-deck JS: new-block ids collided after remove-then-add (duplicate ids, both
deleted on remove); the default new-block source
power_wwasn't in the live-value map (rendered n/a); drag-drop placement was asymmetric; save didn't re-render the normalized doc. All fixed. (console.rs) - Drivers page showed
"temperature"with JSON quotes for the stopped reason. Now the bare string. (web.rs)
Maintainability
percent_decode/ form-field parsing existed in three divergent copies; consolidated into oneformmodule used by web, service and dashboard. The CSPRNG-to-hex helper is now one function (auth::rand_hex).- Added a test asserting the published state topics match the registry contract (the "single source of truth" claim for topics was previously unenforced).
Deferred (reported, not blocking)
ui.rsis now largely dead: onlyvalidate_deck/default_deck(+ two consts) are used (byservice.rs); the legacy console (page,dashboard_page,sidebar,NAV, the CSS/JS consts,icon/group_icon_svgwhichBox::leak) has no callers. Recommend moving the two deck helpers to adeckmodule and deleting the rest. (~34 KB)control::target_labelvsapp::target_labelare two implementations of the same mapping; recommend one canonical (e.g. intuning).DECK_CSS/DECK_JS/TERMINAL_JSare large inline strings; recommend moving toassets/*.js|css,include_str!, and serving under/assetslike the stylesheets, so they can be linted.web.rsstill owns host-fact gatherers (system_rows, ...) thatconsole.rsconsumes; recommend ahostfactsmodule both depend on.route()is long; the/api/*arm could be anapi_route().Dashboard::page()is now test-only (console renders pages); remove or mark reference-only.- serve_sim's control loop spins silently if the in-process HAL thread dies; recommend
surfacing the fault and dropping
running(the real-hardwareboot_halloop already exits on a HAL write error, so this is dev-path only). make-zynq-afw.shusage comment omits--sdk-dir(doc drift).- No change-password route exists though the login page tells the operator to change admin/admin; wire one or soften the text.
Accepted-by-design posture (stated, not defects)
The box is SSH-guarded and the console is defense-in-depth on a shared network:
- No TLS: the console is HTTP on
0.0.0.0:80, so a passive sniffer can capture the password and session cookie. This is the dominant residual risk and should be made explicit to the operator. A TLS front (or binding the console to a management interface / WireGuard) is the real mitigation. - Factory
admin/adminwith nothing forcing a change; the login page prints it. /api/terminalis a gated (session + token) root/bin/sh- an accepted diagnostic on an already-root-reachable box. Note the shipped terminal UI does not send the token, so it is fail-closed/unusable until a token is supplied.- The web process runs as root (binds 80); consider a post-bind privilege drop.
/api/hardware|summary|controlare intentionally open (interface of record, mirror of the cgminer socket).- PBKDF2 at 50k iterations - low by modern standards, accepted behind SSH; matters only if the hash leaks (now 0600).
make-zynq-afw.shalways passes--allow-unsigned(bench-only helper; do not reuse on a release path).
Verification after fixes
Live --serve-sim: unauthenticated GET / serves the login page; admin/admin issues a session
and the console renders; /api/files returns 403 without a token; a CRLF-injected __section
is neutralized (303, no header split); the editable deck saves and reloads. clippy -D warnings
clean; 206 lib tests + integration pass.